Title: Auctions with a multi-member bidder
Begin: Tuesday, 14. of March 2023 (1:00 PM)
Room Q4.245
Abstract:
I consider an auction in which one bidder is a team, consisting of symmetric individuals for whom the auctioned item is a public good: if the team wins it, they all enjoy it. Team members need to agree on a bid, and on splitting the burden of payment if they win; these decisions are taken through a mechanism. If the auction format is second-price, the game has a symmetric equilibrium. Under the first-price and all-pay formats, if there exists an equilibrium, then it is extremely asymmetric: one member participates in the mechanism, and everybody else free ride.
Shiran is interested in various areas of microeconomic/game theory, mainly in bargaining theory and fair division. He has published numerous papers in top journals and a lively speaker.
